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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

FAMILY LAW-AvAILABIiTy oF THIRD-PARTY COLLATERAL ATTACK ON
ALABAMA BILATERAL DIVORCE DECREES IN NEW YORK
Plaintiff obtained an Alabama divorce from her first husband, who appeared in that action but did not challenge her allegation of domicile. Several
years later plaintiff remarried. After marital discord developed, plaintiff wife
filed the present action for legal separation in New York. Defendant husband
counterclaimed for annulment, alleging that plaintiff's prior Alabama divorce
was invalid for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because at the time of the
Alabama divorce neither plaintiff nor her first husband were Alabama domiciliaries. Defendant husband, a member of the New York bar, had signed
(fourteen months before this action was filed) a stipulation recognizing that the
parties were legally married. The Supreme Court, at Special Term, found the
Alabama divorce decree invalid for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and
declared the subsequent marriage void. The Appellate Division modified the
decree as to the support provisions, and, as modified, affirmed it without in any
way challenging the lower court's holding that the Alabama divorce decree was
invalid. The Court of Appeals, two judges dissenting, held, that the defendant
husband could not attack the Alabama divorce decree collaterally in New
York, and that the Alabama decree could be attacked only in the Alabama
courts. Weisner v. Weisner, 17 N.Y.2d 799, 218 N.E.2d 300, 271 N.Y.S.2d
252 (1966).
The constitutional requirement of full faith and credit' demands that a
sister state divorce decree be given the same effect in the forum state as it enjoys
in the state of rendition. 2 In determining whether to allow collateral attack on a
bi-lateral divorce decree obtained in a sister state, the forum state must examine
the law of the rendering state.3 The Supreme Court has said, "when a divorce
cannot be attacked for lack of jurisdiction by parties actually before the
court or strangers in the rendering state, it cannot be attacked by them anywhere in the Union."14 Accordingly, collateral attack will be permitted by
New York courts only when the rendering state permits such attack. "1... [New
York] courts continue to look to the law of the rendering state to determine
to what extent persons not parties to the original judgment are estopped from
attacking domicil in divorce actions in which both parties have appeared."5
Hence, inquiry must be directed to a determination of Alabama law.
In Alabama, the procedure for collaterally attacking a divorce decree is
the filing of a "Bill in the Nature of a Bill of Review." 0 This bill is avail7
able where fraud has been committed on the court or on one of the litigants.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
Id. at 589.
Herzog, Conflict of Laws, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 147, 151 (1962).

6. Reese, Grounds for and Method of Setting Aside an Alabama Divorce, 37
345, 346 (1965).
7. Ibid.

N.Y.S.B.J.
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It should be noted that "to sustain such a bill, however, the fraud must be
extrinsic and not intrinsic." 8 Where fraud has been committed upon the court
(e.g., by false allegation of residence) the bill is available to a third party, unless the third party is barred by the statute of limitations, estoppel, or laches.9
The statute of limitations allows a third party to attack within three years
after the rendition of the decree. 10 Where "circumstances are shown, excusing
the delay, such as lack of knowledge of the fraud and other circumstances ...
the time generally is extended for a year after knowledge of the same, regardless
of how long it might be."'1 The Alabama courts of equity will estop collateral
attack on the divorce decree, however, if the court finds that the attacking
party was either a privy,' 2 or had "actuated, dominated, participated, and
procured the decree that by this suit is challenged. . . ."-3 Laches will also bar
the attack if the court finds that the attacking party did not use due diligence
in the discovery of the fraud or in the bringing of the action. 14 Therefore, where
a party knew or should have known of the fraud, but has not sued within one
year of the discovery, laches will bar the action. 15
In the recent case of Hartiganv. Hartigan,'° the Supreme Court of Alabama
held its courts had power to invalidate a divorce decree sua sponte when both
of the original parties to that decree reappeared before the court and candidly
admitted that a fraud had been committed upon it. The Hartigan decision appears to be limited to its unusual facts, for six months later the same court
distinguished the Hartigan case on the grounds that in that case both of the
original parties were before the court. 17 It seems clear that when an innocent
third party (one who had no knowledge of the divorce and did not participate
in obtaining the decree) marries a person who had fraudulently obtained an
Alabama divorce decree, he can collaterally attack that decree within one year
after the discovery of the fraud' 8 and in fact stands in a better position to
attack than a party to the original divorce decree.', Under Alabama law
neither remarriage nor resulting issue will prevent the court from invalidating
the divorce decree.2 0 Therefore, where the requisite fraud is present, collateral
attack will be permitted to third parties in Alabama courts unless the statute
of limitations, laches or estoppel bar the action.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
161 So.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 346.
See generally Reese, supra note 6.
Titus v. Nieheiser, 269 Ala. 493, 114 So. 2d 242 (1959).
Reese, supra note 6, at 351.
Mussey v. Mussey, 251 Ala. 439, 37 So. 2d 921 (1948).
Fairdough v. St. Amand, 217 Ala. 19, 21, 114 So. 472, 473 (1927).
Lutsky v. Lutsky, 183 So. 2d 782 (Ala. 1966); Winston v. Winston, 276 Ala. 303,
2d 588 (1964); Aiello v. Aiello, 272 Ala. 505, 133 So. 2d 18 (1961).
Ibid.
272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725 (1961).
Aiello v. Aiello, 272 Ala. 505, 133 So. 2d 18 (1961).
Lutsky v. Lutsky, 183 So. 2d 782 (Ala. 1966); Aiello v. Aiello, supra note 17;

Reese, supra note 6.
19. Reese, supra note 6, at 347.
20. Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725 (1961); Davis v. Davis, 255
Ala. 488, 51 So. 2d 876 (1951).
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This is the first time the New York Court of Appeals has had the opportunity to determine whether a bi-lateral Alabama divorce decree could be
collaterally attacked by third parties. New York lower court opinions, attempting
to follow the mandate of full faith and credit without guidance from the Court
of Appeals, evidence confusion as to when Alabama courts allow attack on their
divorce decrees. Two recent New York Supreme Court decisions, 21 among many,
illustrate this confusion. In both cases, the husband had knowledge of the
prior Alabama divorce obtained by his present wife. In fact, both husbands had
participated in obtaining the decrees, by driving their present wives to the
airport and picking them up on their return from Alabama. The husbands also
knew of the fraud committed upon the Alabama court. One court held that
the husband could collaterally attack the Alabama decree, 22 while the other
declared the husband barred by Alabama law from collaterally attacking the
Alabama decree.2 3 The announced public policy of New York is one of
supporting the continuity of marriage. 24 Therefore, when New York's courts
consider whether to permit a collateral attack on a sister state divorce that
would result in the annulment of a later marriage, the court places a heavy
burden on the attacking party to establish that the rendering state permits
25
such attack.
The Court of Appeals, in its per curiam majority opinion, determined that
in New York "collateral attack is permitted by strangers on divorce decrees..
where it is clear that the rendering state permits such attack .... ,, The Court
however, concluded that under the facts of the instant case Alabama law is
unclear, and hence, New York will not permit collateral attack. The Court
considered Alabama to be the only available forum for attack. In weighing
defendant's chances of success it is significant that he was advised by his
attorney eighteen months before this action that his wife's previous Alabama
divorce was invalid. The Court, in holding that Alabama law is unclear, appears
to have assumed that the opinion of his attorney was not the "knowledge of
the fraud" that Alabama required to bar the attack. The two dissenting
judges thought the Alabama law to be clear enough to hold the defendant
husband barred by laches from collaterally attacking the decree. As the New
21. Yenoff v. Yenoff, 50 Misc. 2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Parrish v. Parrish, 50 Misc. 2d
827, 271 N.Y.S.2d 792 (Sup. Ct. 1966). See also, e.g., Weisner v. Weisner, 23 A.D.2d 632,
258 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1st Dep't 1965); Magowan v. Magowan, 45 Misc. 2d 972, 258 N.Y.S.2d
516 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Rosenbluth v. Rosenbluth, 34 Misc. 2d 290, 228 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sup.
Ct. 1962).
22. Yenoff v. Yenoff, supra note 21. The court's opinion seems to confuse comity

and full faith and credit. It makes no mention of controlling Alabama law but cites cases
dealing with foreign divorces.
23. Parrish v. Parrish, 50 Misc. 2d 827, 271 N.Y.S.2d 792 (Sup. Ct. 1966). This is a
well reasoned opinion that discusses Alabama law and the requirements of full faith and
credit.
24. See N.Y. Gen. Obligations Law § 5-311.
25. Wilkov v. Wilkov, 13 A.D.2d 471, 212 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1st Dep't 1961). This opinion
adopts the federal policy as stated by justice Frankfurter in Williams v. North Carolina,
325 U.S. 226 (1945).
26. Instant case at 802, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
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York decisions mentioned above show, the lower courts of New York are in
need of direction by the Court of Appeals as to when to permit a collateral
attack on the Alabama divorce decrees. The determination of this question is
important to the thousands of New Yorkers who have obtained Alabama divorces
and have since remarried. Before the Hartigan7 decision it was fairly simple
to obtain an Alabama "quickie" divorce. After that decision, the Supreme
Court of Alabama began a policy of scrutinizing "quickie" Alabama divorce
decrees, a policy which in effect limited their availability.28 The post-Hartigan
decisions reveal that the equitable safeguards against unrestrained attacks
(laches and estoppel) have not been abandoned but continue to bar those who
have "unclean hands" or have not acted timely.29 However, pre-Hartigan
Alabama divorces do have continued legal stability and most will be immune
to collateral attack.
Neither the majority nor dissent state reasons for their conclusions. The
assumptions underlying the dissent's reasoning seem persuasive, for if an
Alabama court finds that the attacking party has remained silent for more than
one year after he knew or should have known of the fraud, laches will bar his
attack.30 The majority does not tell us why it found the law of Alabama to be
unclear, and hence a rare opportunity to dispel the confusion in the lower courts
of New York was not realized. The practical effect of this decision is to require
New York residents to litigate in Alabama an issue that the courts of New York
have the power to determine. 3 1 Thus the decision places a heavy burden of both
time and expense on the attacking party by requiring him to apply to the
Alabama courts to determine the validity of the Alabama decree. To be sure,
this will deter some parties from attacking Alabama divorces. This deterrence
is calculated to promote New York's policy of stabilizing marriage. 32 At the
same time, it tends to discriminate against those who can ill afford litigation
in the courts of another state. 38
HENRY K. GARSON
27. Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725 (1961).
28. Reese, supra note 6, at 346.
29. Lutsky v. Lutsky, 183 So. 2d 782 (Ala. 1966); Aiello v. Aiello, 272 Ala. 505, 133
So. 2d 18 (1961).

30. See generally, Reese, supra note 6.
31. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
32. See N.Y. Gen. Obligations Law § 5-311.
33. In contrast to the holding in the instant case, Phillips v. Phillips, 15 Misc. 2d
884, 180 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1958) held that the "defendant [husband] . . . having
failed to establish that the divorce state would permit the defendant to attack the decree,
he cannot in this State expect a contrary ruling." Id. at 903, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 495. This decision, being on the merits, will bar the attacking party from going to the rendering state to
attack the decree as the decision would be entitled to full faith and credit.

